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Labor Demand in the Post-apartheid South African Wine Industry 
Abstract 
In 2013 the minimum wage for farm workers in South Africa increased by an unprecedented 
51%. This paper uses data on 77 Western Cape wine grape farms, for 2005-2015, to estimate 
the impacts on employment.  Earlier post-apartheid labor market reforms increased minimum 
wages substantially, but renewed access to global markets increased demand and this 
protected jobs in the wine industry, however, by 2005 this growth had largely ceased. A long 
run wage elasticity of -0.38 was found for permanent workers, but for casuals the figure was -
4.73, that is the 51% increase in the wage is expected to reduce casual employment by 240%.  
Thus, casual workers, who are the poorest and most vulnerable, lose both in terms of jobs and 
income, whereas permanent staff gain. Thus, the minimum wage changes are likely to 
increase the gap between privileged permanent staff and the casual workers as these bear all 
the adjustment costs.  This result is not so surprising in view of the long-standing 
interdependence of farmers and their permanent workers in South African wine grape 
production.  Thus, it is highly unlikely that minimum wage legislation will improve the 
welfare of workers. 
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Labor Demand in the Post-apartheid South African Wine Industry 
1.  Introduction 
Black laborers in South Africa were subject to an elaborate system of domination and control 
under apartheid (Wolpe, 1972) and collective action was illegal until the late 1970s (Adler 
and Webster, 1995).  Yet even when industrial workers started to gain these basic rights, 
agricultural labor remained exempt and the living and working conditions of these workers 
only improved after 1994.  Just prior to the end of apartheid, the government passed the 
Agricultural Labour Act (Act 14 of 1993) although this was generally regarded as an 
ineffectual piece of legislation.  Since the election of the democratic government in 1994 five 
main pieces of labor legislation have been enacted, the most important of which is the Basic 
Conditions of Employment Act (Act 75 of 1997).  Included in this Act was the requirement 
that all employment contracts had to be in writing and regulations regarding leave, etc. 
clearly stated.  This Act also introduced a statutory minimum wage for agriculture, which was 
introduced in 2003.2 
Evidence of the short run adjustment to these reforms is mixed and the long run outcomes are 
unknown, although it is clear that the interpretation of these reforms differed across the 
country.  For example, in KwaZulu-Natal Province these labor reforms destroyed many 
permanent jobs mainly because farmers understood the Tenure Act to be a potential land grab 
(Newman et al., 1997; Sparrow et al., 2008).  However, more generally, the effect of these 
reforms is poorly documented.  Thus, the current discussions about the impact of a universal 
minimum wage for agriculture of ZAR3500 (US$250) per month are based on limited 
empirical evidence. 
By modern standards, South Africa retains a unique farm labor market. Family farms are still 
the dominant form, but usually black staff do the work on the farm under the supervision and 
management of the white owners. Tied housing on the property means the workers live in 
close proximity to their employers and this has bound the two groups together in mutual 
obligations that go beyond the typical employment contract (Du Toit, 1993). Du Toit (1993; 
320) described the paternalism on wine farms as a position of: 
“ ‘pa staan vir die werkers’: quite literally, ‘occupying the place of the father’, ‘taking 
responsibility’. But even when it is not explicitly conceptualised in this way, this 
‘organic’ interpretation saturates the discourse of farmers and farm workers alike. To 
start work on a farm is not merely to enter a business relationship, it is to become deel 
van een familie (part of one family), even deel van die plaas (part of the farm).” 
One way in which farmers took responsibility for their staff was to supplement cash wages 
with a range of goods and services considered necessary for a decent life, which ranged from 
medical and day care and funeral benefits to free housing and electricity, water, garbage 
disposal, firewood and farm shops (Van der Merwe, 1976; Conradie, 2005b). Although 
widely criticised, this paternalistic relationship has been remarkably resistant to reform 
                                                             
2 Also influential was the Security of Tenure Act (Act 62 of 1997), which formalized customary tenure rights on 
farms for resident farm workers.  Other legislation includes the Labour Relations Act (Act 66 of 1995), the 
Employment Equity Act (No 55 of 1998) and the Skills Development Act (Act 97 of 1998). 
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(Ewert and du Toit, 2005). Some of these non-cash benefits were scraped when higher cash 
wages were imposed (Conradie, 2005b; Zvoutete, 2014), which left workers feeling isolated 
and discontented.  However, despite this, more than half the hired farm laborers were in 
permanent employment as recently as 2007 (Statistics South Africa, 2010). 
An interesting question to be addressed is whether this historic special relationship between 
farmers and workers insulate permanent employees from market forces when wages rise. 
Since the price of permanent labor has risen substantially over the past ten years, a model of 
labor demand can be used to examine the impact of reducing labor costs by increased 
mechanization and casualization. In neither case is it clear from the existing literature what 
the outcomes may be. Ewert and Hamman (1999) claimed that there was no evidence of large 
scale reduction of permanent labor in the second half of the 1990s, but Sunde and Kleinbooi 
(1999) and Du Toit and Ally (2003) recorded extensive casualization across all sectors of 
Western Cape agriculture. Furthermore, both Ewert and Hamman (1999) and Conradie 
(2005a) have provided evidence of the capacity to mechanize grape harvesting. However, 
apart from harvesting, the opportunities for mechanisation are limited and Conradie (2005a) 
found that employment initially adjusted slowly to rising statutory minimum wages.  
No systematic employment records exist for the wine industry after 2004. KWV (1997) 
reported a workforce of 45,000 farm workers and by the early 2000s the industry claimed that 
it supported 345,000 workers plus dependents on wine farms (SAWIS, 2004). Assuming a 
figure of 3.5 dependents per worker, and two adult workers per household (Van der Merwe, 
1976; Levy, 1977), this implies a workforce of 49,000 fulltime equivalent workers in 2003.  
This is reasonable and consistent as growth in the sector during the 1990s resulted in area 
planted of around 110,000 hectares by 2003, which accounts for 0.455 jobs per hectare.  
Thus, the impact of the minimum wage thereafter is unclear.  One of the few surveys of wine 
farms in the Breede River Valley reported a decrease in labor demand from 0.42 to 0.37 
fulltime equivalent jobs per hectare when the minimum wage came into effect (Conradie et 
al., 2006), while Sunde and Kleinbooi (1999) and Du Toit and Ally (2003), recorded 
extensive casualization across all sectors of Western Cape agriculture.  This study attempts to 
shed more light on the employment situation in the industry. 
This paper examines the changes in employment, wages and mechanization in the Cape wine 
industry in the period 2005 to 2015, ten years after the first reforms were implemented. Labor 
demand functions are modelled with a systems generalised method of moments (GMM) 
dynamic panel estimator. The new wages elasticities improve on Conradie (2005) by 
quantifying the short and long run impact of rising wages, while long and short run output 
elasticities predict the employment effects of possible expansion.  The remainder of the paper 
is structured as follows.  The next section provides an overview of the South African wine 
industry, including the role of cooperatives in the sector.  Section 3 describes the data and the 
specification of the estimating equation. Section 4 reports the results and discussion. The 
paper ends with brief conclusions and policy implications. 
 
2.  The Wine Industry in South Africa 
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The Koöperatiewe Wijnbouwers Vereniging van Zuid-Afrika Bpkt (KWV) was an industry 
body intended to create unity and serve the wine producers.  KWV was founded in 1918 and 
was granted increasing legislative powers from the 1920s onwards.  While the intention was 
to improve wine quality, the structure of the organisation made it counter-productive as it 
encouraged the production of large quantities of poor quality grapes.  This was because votes 
were given to members regardless of their output and thus biased decisions in favor of the 
numerous small scale operators, who voted for the introduction of generous price floors. The 
huge surpluses that resulted were disposed of by exporting and distilling poorer quality wines 
into brandy, both activities where KWV had de facto monopolies. WHERE DID THESE 
LOW LEVEL EXPORTS GO DURING THIS PERIOD OF SANCTIONS?   
By the 1950s, increased mechanisation was introduced largely to adopt cold fermentation and 
small farms organised themselves into producer co-operatives, partly to enable equipment 
sharing arrangements.  However, this resulted in the grape harvest being pooled, which was 
again detrimental to quality.  The vast majority of the wine was sold in bulk, including to the 
KWV, with the remainder bottled, marketed and distributed under the co-operatives’ own 
labels. 
KWV suspended production quotas in 1992 as part of the deregulation in the agricultural 
sector (Kirsten et al, 2009) BECAUSE OF WHAT? and decision making was transferred to 
the grower co-operatives. Quality had to be upgraded rapidly as the main opportunities lay in 
exports- AGAIN TO WHERE, GIVEN SANCTIONS?. And co-operatives introduced 
processing fees and differentiated output prices by cultivar (Williams et al., 1998).  For 
example, the price premium for noble red varieties over the price of bulk white varieties rose 
from 36% in 1995 to 650% in 2000, although this come down just as rapidly over the next 
five years due to domestic over production, as shown in Figure 1. While red wine prices were 
high, vineyards replaced their vines and area planted expanded rapidly, such that between 
1995 and 2005 approximately 40% of the national vineyard was upgraded from bulk white to 
noble red cultivars. As expected, yields fell while quality increased and the premium this 
attracted made the necessary labor intensive crop control and canopy manipulation 
worthwhile.  However, the changing political situation in South Africa was a concern and 
farmers wishing to insure against further labor reforms found increasing mechanization 
attractive while the high profits made it possible (Newman et al., 1997; Ewert and Hamman, 
1999). 
Figure 1 
But by 2010 the price of Cabernet Sauvignon grapes fell to just 66% more than that of 
Chenin Blanc, which from 2007 had also also begun to fall in real terms. In the decade from 
2005 to 2015 the area under grapes contracted and the unit cost of production rose slightly 
while yields increased at 1.4% per year.  Farmers first abandoned canopy manipulation and 
later crop thinning to gain higher yields although at reduced quality. This return to bulk at the 
expense of quality maximised short run profitability, but the left the Western Cape wine 
industry in a less competitive global position. 
Comment [B1]: Nick? 
Comment [B2]: Was it in response 
to the Kassier commission? 
Comment [B3]: Export 
opportunities arrived with the end of 
sanctions. When was this? 
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A further labor issue for wine grape farms concerns the employment of women.  The Rural 
Foundation, an NGO that supports economic development and training to rural communities, 
particularly women,3 campaigned for gender equality in the sector, which meant fulltime 
positions for women. This was easily achieved in the deciduous fruit industry (Mayson, 1989; 
Kritzinger and Vorster, 1996) where the casual contract lasts for nine months of the year.  But 
this is not the case in the wine industry where casual workers are only needed for three 
months of the year. Levy (1977) described the position of female labor as “permanent 
seasonal” workers, although some wine farmers felt obliged also to employ them during the 
off season so that their families could survive throughout the year. Despite the 27-hour per 
week restrictionIS THIS THE DEFINITON OF A SEASONAL?  SURELY NOT FULL 
TIME imposed by the Basic Conditions of Employment Act (Act 75 of 1997), the system of 
being allowed to “work as you wish” during winter was still widely in use in the Breede 
River Valley in the early 2000s (Conradie, 2003).  This clearly put farmers at risk of not 
complying with the Act.  As farms expanded, the Extension of Security of Tenure Act (Act 
62 of 1997), which was widely interpreted as the start of government condoned land grabs4, 
resulted in more fulltime jobs for women, as having two fulltime workers per dwelling 
limited the exposure of the farm to the risk of land claims. 
With farm women employed fulltime and the peak harvest period supplemented by machine 
picking, it was logical to outsource winter work to casual labor.  This also shifted the 
administrative burden of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act (Act 75 of 1997) although 
Ewert and Du Toit (2005) described this as a growing divide between secure, relatively well 
paid permanent jobs and insecure, poorly paid casual work. Furthermore, on-farm relations 
became more strained as profitability in the wine industry fell causing old privileged 
relationship to make way for new formalized arrangements. In 2012, a strike by farm workers 
in the table grape industry over poor working conditions and outsourcing (Zvoutete, 2014) 
quickly spread to other parts of the province.  This extended into informal rural settlements 
where protesters focussed as much on poor local service delivery as on declining working 
conditions in agriculture.  Protesters’ demands included a doubling of the minimum wage and 
the banning of employment brokers. This did succeed in raising the minimum wage in 
agriculture by 51%, but Zvoutete (2014) notes that it led to immediate retrenchments on some 
farms and a further reduction in services that were previously free and many were worse off.  
 
3.  Data and models 
Sample and Data Sources 
A balanced panel of 77 farms for eleven production seasons, from 2005 to 2015, was taken 
from a larger Vinpro5 survey into which farmers self-select. No farm identifiers were 
                                                             
3 See http://www.charitysa.co.za/lima-rural-development-foundation.html 
4 The Extension of the Security of Tenure Act (Act 62 of 1997) stipulates that workers with more than ten years 
of service can live on the farm for life. Ironically, this was the customary arrangement, but now farmers fear that 
they will be unable to get rid of workers who have left the farm or the dependents of retired workers. 
5 Vinpro is the wine industry producers’ organization that provides support in terms of technical and economic 
advice and is a link with government at the local, provincial and national level.  See www.vinpro.co.za 
Comment [B4]: This caused 
confusion for farmers. The BCEA 
provided for fulltime and parttime 
work only , no seasonal contract. If 
>27 hrs per week, workers had to be 
given fulltime contracts. Farmers 
needed seasonal contracts of fulltime 
employment for a limited period 
(Levy’s point) 
 
To fit in with the silly new law farmers 
could 
1.Scale back on their use of farm 
women to <27hrs/ week 
2.Make women fulltime and grow 
into the larger permanent 
workforce. On farms with mostly 
grapes, mechanised picking and 
pruning could address seasonal 
peaks. On farms with a fruit / veg 
component, off-farm casual 
workers provide flexibility 
3.This option I would rather not talk 
about, which was to give farm 
women fulltime contracts with a no 
work no pay clause which could be 
invoked unilaterally during the off-
season, and hope for the best 
 
 
 
 
7 
 
available, but the time series of this sample implies that these farms are amongst the most 
established in the sector. The South African Wine Industry Information System reports that 
the sample farms are three times the size of the industry average with 33% higher yields and 
with 20% lower costs than their peers (www.sawis.co.za). Although these farms received the 
same price for their grapes as other wine farms, their higher yields and lower costs suggest 
greater than average profitability. However, the employment effect of greater profitability is 
uncertain as while this provides a buffer against wage increases it also enables the purchase 
of large-scale labor saving machinery and other equipment.  
At the beginning of the study period (2005) the typical farm in the Vinpro sample produced 
908 tons of grapes on 79 hectares.  One third of these were planted with red varieties. More 
than 80% of vineyards were drip irrigated and an estimated 86% were planted in rows 
appropriate for machine harvesting. The rest of the land is dry land bush vine cultivation and 
yields on this land was 6.6 tons per hectare compared to 16.2 tons per hectare for the trellised 
and irrigated vineyards. About 5% of the area planted was comprised of vines that were older 
than twenty years while only 12% were younger than five years. Over the next ten years the 
size of the typical vineyard in the sample expanded by 10% (see Table 1) and the size of the 
average crush by a third.  However, the cultivar mix remained more or less the same, 
suggesting that many farmers neglected to maintain their vineyards, which accounts for the 
lower proportion of area planted with youngest vines.  The last row of Table 1 shows that 
land per unit of labor rose by 0.83% per year between 2005 and 2015, which does not keep 
up with the 2.23% per year increase in the real wage recorded for the study farms in this 
period. Job losses were perhaps inevitable on these farms, so it is surprising that employment 
fell at only -0.09% per year. The overall level of employment of 0.48 full time equivalent 
workers per hectare remained unchanged on the farms in this sample during the period 2005 
to 2015, and largely unchanged from the 0.45 jobs per hectare established before the 
minimum wage had had much effect (Conradie et al., 2006). The proportion of casual to total 
labor remained almost unchanged during the study period, at just over one third and is far 
lower than the 50% reported by Du Toit and Ally (2003). 
The financial data were deflated to constant 2010 prices using the consumer price index from 
the Department of Agriculture and Fisheries’ (2015) Abstract of Agricultural Statistics. The 
practice at Vinpro is that in cases where multiple crops are produced, overhead costs are 
allocated to individual enterprises according to area planted, turnover or physical output, 
whichever is most appropriate in each case. Since most grape sales are to co-operative 
wineries that pay out over multiple years, farm-level revenue figures are estimates. A farm-
level weighted average wine price was computed by dividing the expected income from 
grapes by the total tons picked. The proxy for mechanisation is the percentage of grapes 
picked by machine and Table 1 also shows the potential for mechanical picking, which as 
noted above, is the proportion of vineyards with suitably spaced trellising systems. 
Table 1 
Wages and employment data are from the payroll. For permanent labor there is both the wage 
bill and the number of workers employed, so that the average permanent wage is simply one 
divided by the other. This identified a substantial wage premium for Stellenbosch district, 
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which is adjacent to the Cape Town metropolitan area and has better educated workers with a 
higher level of training.  For casual workers only total remuneration is available. The number 
of fulltime equivalent casual jobs was calculated by dividing this wage bill by the statutory 
minimum wage. The only exception to this rule again was Stellenbosch where it was assumed 
that casual workers enjoy the same wage premium as permanent workers. This was 50% 
between 2005 and 2008 and 74% thereafter.  A weighted average wage for all labor was 
computed by dividing the total payroll by the imputed overall employment for each farm.  
Descriptive statistics for all data used in the estimations are shown in Table 1. 
The ten original districts in the sample were aggregated into four regions: The Breede River 
Valley, the Orange River Valley, Stellenbosch and the remainder of the sector, labelled West 
Coast. These regions each have a unique character. Stellenbosch represents quality wine. The 
West Coast contains most of the dryland vineyards and the Orange River has a hot, arid 
climate that is detrimental to wine quality but has access to adequate irrigation water. In the 
post-boom period, the Breede Valley region has a mild climate and good access to irrigation 
and accounts for most of the remaining industry growth. 
Wage determination is led by the statutory minimum wage for agriculture. This was 
introduced in March 2003 and was stratified by level of economic activity until 2009. Like 
other rates set by collective bargaining, the agricultural minimum wage in South Africa 
barely kept up with inflation during the first ten years. For example, in 2005 a nominal rate of 
R4.03 per hour applied in outlying areas while richer districts closer to the urban edge were 
required to pay R4.87 per hour. In 2006 the wage rate increased to R4.54 and R5.10 per hour, 
respectively. For the first nine years of the period covered in this study the gap between 
casual and permanent wage rates in areas outside Stellenbosch was 28.6% and the size of the 
gap was inversely related to the level of casualization, even if corrected by the fewer hours 
worked by casual labor (correlation coefficient, ρ = -0.61, and probability, p<0.000). Table 1 
shows that for a brief time during the late 2000s, rising energy costs appeared to accelerate 
casualization in the wine industry.  For example, the global financial crisis increased fuel 
prices by 48% in 2008 and casual workers could be used instead of machine harvesting. 
Permanent employment reached its lowest level of just 25.3 jobs per farm in this sample in 
2009 while the number of fulltime equivalent casual workers employed peaked at 17.2 in the 
same year. Then, in November 2012 farm workers across the Western Cape went on strike to 
demand a doubling of the minimum wage. A 51% nominal increase, from R7.71 to R11.66 
per hour, was awarded from March 2013. The corresponding real increase of 42.5% is 
reflected in the 2014 data. Table 1 shows that the wage gap (the difference between the 
minimum wage and the permanent wage) in all areas was reduced to zero in 2014 and 2.27% 
in 2015, with the exception of Stellenbosch. Even though wages in Stellenbosch were 
historically higher, the wage gap also fell dramatically from 26% in 2013 to just 5% in 2014.  
The 51% wage rate increase had little effect on permanent employment during the first two 
years after 2013. In 74% of cases the same number of permanent workers was employed in 
2014 as in 2013.  In this sample, the loss of 25 permanent jobs was offset by 34 new 
permanent jobs so that the immediate effect of the increase in the statutory minimum wage 
was to create rather than destroy permanent positions. However, there was much more of an 
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impact on the casual workers. About 90% of farms reported a change in their level of casual 
employment in 2014 compared with 2013 and in 80% of cases they reported a decrease in 
casual labor. On average 6.5 fulltime equivalent casual jobs were lost per farm. Two farms 
each reported the loss of more than forty fulltime equivalent positions. With only 36.4 new 
casual jobs created the net loss was 340 full time equivalent casual positions. With the wage 
gap between permanent and casual workers now almost nothing future wage increases will 
affect permanent employment as well. 
Variable Selection and Models 
The labor economics literature contains fewer wage elasticity estimates than the policy 
importance of these warrants.  This can be explained by the fact that employment and wages 
are typically endogenous and before dynamic panel estimation techniques were commonplace 
few studies have been able to present convincing instruments for either of these variables. 
Due to hiring and firing costs, employment levels do not adjust instantaneously to changes in 
factor prices, capital stock or environmental shocks (Hamermesh, 1993). Following the 
notation in Roodman (2009a) a linear model with one dynamic dependent variable can be 
specified to capture this phenomenon: 
𝑦𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝑦𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝒙𝑖𝑖′ 𝜷 + 𝜀𝑖𝑖 (1) 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝜀𝑖𝑖 = 𝜇𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝑖 
𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝐸(𝜇𝑖) = 𝐸(𝑣𝑖𝑖) = 𝐸(𝜇𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑖) = 0 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑖 is the level of employment in farm i at period t, 𝛼 is the rate of adjustment, 𝑦𝑖𝑖−1 is 
the amount of labor used in the previous period, 𝒙𝑖𝑖 is a vector of control variables including 
but not limited to input prices and stocks, in the manner of Petrick and Zier (2012) and 𝜀𝑖𝑖 is a 
two-part error that can be decomposed into a farm fixed effect 𝜇𝑖 and an orthogonal iid error, 
𝑣𝑖𝑖.  
Removing fixed effects with a first difference transform gives the foundation of the 
difference GMM model presented in Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) and Arellano and Bond 
(1991). 
∆𝑦𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼∆𝑦𝑖𝑖−1 + ∆𝒙𝑖𝑖′ 𝜷 + ∆𝑣𝑖𝑖  (2) 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒 ∆𝑦𝑖𝑖 = 𝑦1𝑖 − 𝑦𝑖𝑖−1 
𝑎𝑎𝑎 ∆𝑦𝑖𝑖−1 = 𝑦1𝑖−1 − 𝑦𝑖𝑖−2 etc. 
Anderson and Hsiao (1981) suggest that the differenced lagged dependent variable, ∆𝑦𝑖𝑖−1,  
is mathematically still related to the differenced error term and is instrumented with the level 
𝑦𝑖𝑖−2  that is uncorrelated with ∆𝑣𝑖𝑖. In contrast, Arellano and Bond (1991) instrument 𝑦𝑖𝑖−2 
and other endogenous and predetermined regressors with longer lags, a process that has 
become known as GMM instrumenting. In this paper, the choice of the Blundell-Bond 
systems GMM estimator (Blundell and Bond, 1998), was motivated by the likelihood of a 
slow adjustment in farm employment (𝛼 close to 1) and a desire to retain an equation in 
levels. Operationally, the more efficient one-step version was used here. In response to the 
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suggestion by Roodman (2009a) that different sized instrument sets should be included to 
compare alternative specifications of the estimating equation these were done and evaluated 
using Arellano and Bond’s AR(2) statistic, Hansen’s J-test of over-identification of the 
instrument matrix.  The significance of the coefficients of interest are reported in Table 2 
along with other diagnostic tests. 
Three versions of the basic model are fitted: overall employment (3a), which includes 
permanent and casual labor together, and permanent (3b) and casual (3c) labor separately. In 
addition to lagged employment, control variables included the wage and its lag, capital and its 
lag and output and its lag, following for example, Arellano and Bond (1991) and Micevska 
(2008). Simpler versions have omitted output (Blundell and Bond, 1998) or capital (Basu et 
al., 2005) and Petric and Zier (2012) expanded this specification to examine the effect of 
policy interventions. Output is proxied by the size of the vineyard,6 while the wine price 
provides information on demand shocks.  Regional dummy variables capture spatial 
heterogeneity and as suggested by Roodman (2009b) a series of time dummy variables is also 
included.  The final estimating equations in first differences can be expressed: ln 𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑜 = 𝛼0𝑖 + 𝛼1 ln 𝐿𝑖𝑖−1𝑜 + 𝛽1 ln𝑌𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽2 ln𝑌𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛾1 ln𝑊𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾2 ln𝑊𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝜁1 ln𝐶𝑖𝑖 +
𝜁2 ln𝐶𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝜂1 ln𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝜗𝑖4𝑛=1 𝑅𝑖 + ∑ 𝜅𝑘11𝑘=1 𝑅𝑘 + 𝑣𝑖𝑖     [3a] ln 𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑝 = 𝛼0𝑖 + 𝛼1 ln 𝐿𝑖𝑖−1𝑝 + 𝛽1 ln𝑌𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽2 ln𝑌𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛾1 ln𝑊𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾2 ln𝑊𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝜁1 ln𝐶𝑖𝑖 +
𝜁2 ln𝐶𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝜂1 ln𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝐴𝑊𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝜗𝑖4𝑛=1 𝑅𝑖 + ∑ 𝜅𝑘11𝑘=1 𝑅𝑘 + 𝑣𝑖𝑖   [3b] ln 𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑐 = 𝛼0𝑖 + 𝛼1 ln 𝐿𝑖𝑖−1𝑐 + 𝛽1 ln𝑌𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽2 ln𝑌𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛾1 ln𝑊𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾2 ln𝑊𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝜁1 ln𝐶𝑖𝑖 +
𝜁2 ln𝐶𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝜂1 ln𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖 + 𝜑𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝜗𝑖4𝑛=1 𝑅𝑖 + ∑ 𝜅𝑘11𝑘=1 𝑅𝑘 + 𝑣𝑖𝑖   [3c] 
where the dependent variables 𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑜  , 𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑝  𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑐  are demand for overall, permanent and total 
labor, respectively,  for farms i at time t.  Y is area planted in hectares and W the annual wage 
in constant ZAR.  C is the running cost of capital in constant ZAR, which is defined as the 
sum of fuel, electricity and insurance costs plus licence fees. Repairs and maintenance are 
excluded because these tend to be lumpy. WP is the farm-level wine price in constant ZAR 
per ton. All continuous variables are expressed in natural logarithms. Ri and Rk represent four 
regional and eleven production season/year dummy variables to capture fixed effects and 
seasonal differences and vit is an uncorrelated error term. To link the two labor markets, (3b) 
and (3c) each include an exogenous variable to represent the other labor category. Finally, the 
model for permanent staff (3b) includes the statutory minimum wage AWit and the model for 
casual labor (3c) includes the number of permanent workers employed RSit . 
The three models were estimated and care taken to prevent instrument proliferation.7 Table 2 
shows that for each dependent variable, four instrument specifications were tested. Apart 
from the usual F and t-tests several other diagnostics are needed to confirm adequate 
specification in dynamic panel models. Thus, Table 2 reports Hansen’s test of the joint 
validity of the instrument set, for which the null hypothesis requires that the instrument 
                                                             
6 Some authors use value of sales on the grounds that firm performance is determined by sales rather than 
production (Micevska, 2008).  However, in this study physical output performed better than sales. 
7 The model was estimated in Stata 13 using xtabond2, with the collapse option. 
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matrix is overidentified.  Roodman (2009a) suggests that p-values approaching 1 and below 
0.10 should be viewed with suspicion. It is noted that first differenced variables are 
uncorrelated with the underlying variables for which they are instruments if AR(2) is 
stationary. Here, 0.05 is an appropriate cut off. The final diagnostic test involves ensuring 
that the coefficient of adjustment (γ1), which is explained further below, falls within the range 
of estimates derived with OLS and a fixed effects panel model. For these data the ranges of 
(1-α) were from 0.096 for OLS to 0.481 for the panel, in the case of overall employment, 
0.008 to 0.376 for permanent workers and 0.150 to 0.577 for casual workers. These test 
results are discussed in the next section. 
Table 2 
In partial adjustment models the coefficient γ1 is the short-run wage elasticity and (𝛾1 + 𝛾2) (1 − 𝛼1)⁄  the long run elasticity for a system in equilibrium (Basu et al., 2005; 
Babecký et al., 2012) and 𝛼1 is the adjustment elasticity. The median lag length is 𝑡∗ =log𝛼 0.5 (Hamermesh, 1993). Demand functions are well behaved if both long and short run 
wage elasticities are negative. Elasticities of less than unity implies that the total wage bill 
will increase if wages are increased. The elasticity of employment with respect to output is 𝛽1 
in the short run and (𝛽1 + 𝛽2) (1 − 𝛼1)⁄  in the long run. Values of less than zero indicate 
decreased employment and less than unity means that employment will increase less than 
output. The expected sign on the operating cost of machinery is positive as capital and labor 
are normally substitutes. The wine price should also have a positive sign, as it shifts the 
demand curve for labor outwards. Since permanent and casual labor are substitutes, the 
expected sign on the statutory minimum wage is positive, while casual employment is 
expected to decrease with each additional permanent worker employed. 
 
4.  Results and Discussion 
Wage elasticities by type of labor 
Since we were interested in the relative wage responsiveness of each type of employment, 
separate models of overall, permanent and casual labor demand were fitted and the last two 
are more fully reported. Estimation was by iteration from the smallest to the larger GMM 
instrument matrix to avoid instrument proliferation, which is a serious concern when fitting 
dynamic panel models of employment (Roodman, 2009a). The most complex specifications 
treated employment, wages, output, capital cost and the wine price as endogenous and 
retained only the year and area dummy variables as exogenous instrumental variable (IV) 
style instruments. Specifications 5-8, reported in Table 2, also controlled for the level of the 
statutory minimum wage, which was always an IV-style instrument. Specifications 9-12, 
controlled for the level of permanent employment on the farm in addition to all the other 
variables, keeping permanent labor in the IV set. Table 2 reports the results of the diagnostic 
tests for all models.  
Table 3 reports the estimation results of the four preferred demand specifications. There is 
one each for overall employment and casual labor and two for permanent labor. These results 
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are discussed together in the remainder of this section.  Overall labor demand is best captured 
by specification 2 (from the list in Table 2), which assumes employment, wages and output to 
be endogenous. This model had 47 instruments and an F-stat = 144.28, see the lower part of 
Table 3. The p-value of 0.452 in Table 2 shows that the AR(2) process is stationary and 
combined with p = 0.256 on Hansen’s test means the instrument set is jointly valid. 
Specification 2 was the only version of overall labor demand where over-identification is not 
rejected, making it the preferred specification. The fitted coefficient of adjustment (1 – αt-1 = 
1 – 0.650 = 0.350) is within the range of 0.096 and 0.841 specified by OLS and the fixed 
effects model. The median lag length is 1.61 years, a far more rapid adjustment than typically 
reported for European family farms (Petrick and Zier 2012; Pietola and Myers, 2000; Stefano 
et al., 1992). The short run wage coefficient is negative as expected and although the 
coefficient on lagged wages is positive, the net effect is still negative (γt + γt-1 =-0.341 + 
0.208 = -0.133). The short run output effect is positive and while its long run effect is 
negative, the overall effect is positive as expected. The lack of significance of the capital 
variable indicates that once machines are in place their use is not responsive to the wage or 
the fuel price. This irreversibility is a well-documented feature of farm machinery.  The lack 
of significance of the wine price reflects the fact that the cooperative pooling system does not 
properly reward quality.  
Table 3 
Treating capital cost as endogenous as well as employment, wages and output produced a 
better fit for the demand for permanent labor than keeping it in the IV instrument set with the 
wine price, minimum wage, area planted and the year/season dummy variables. With 48 
instruments this version of the demand for permanent labor has a value of p<0.18 on 
Hansen’s test. Together p<0.328 on the AR(2) process, a coefficient of adjustment of 1 – αt-1 
= 1 – 0.799 = 0.201, an F-statistic significant at p<0.000 and point estimates on the important 
variables significant at p<0.05, this model is clearly a good representation of the demand for 
permanent labor on wine farms. As before the cost of mechanization and the wine price does 
not affect permanent employment directly. 
Reassigning the wine price from IV to a GMM instrument increased the number of 
instruments from 48 to 58 in specification 8. Despite the larger instrument set, this model 
passed Hansen’s test with p<0.202 and the AR(2) test with p<0.391. The F-statistic of F = 
4276.32 pointed to joint significance and the coefficient estimates on the variables of interest 
remain robust. The coefficient of adjustment (1 – αt-1 = 1 – 0.772= 0.228) is only marginally 
larger than before and still within the acceptable range. The short run wage coefficient of -
0.30 in Table 3 is negative as expected, and larger in magnitude than the coefficient on the 
lagged wage (0.1397), so that the long run wage elasticity is still negative as expected. 
Likewise, the positive short run area coefficient is large enough to keep the lagged output 
coefficient (0.3116 - 0.1849 = 0.1267) from producing a negative output elasticity. As before 
neither the wine price nor the cost of mechanization materially affected the employment- 
wage relationship for this category of labor. 
Both estimates of the coefficient of adjustment for permanent labor are smaller than the 
coefficient of adjustment for overall employment. Instead of just 1.61 years to get halfway to 
Comment [B5]: Jenny 
 
This is where we begin to  talk about 
the two options that produce the two 
elasticity options for regular staff 
Comment [B6]: Option 2 for regular 
labour 
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the new steady state, it takes the permanent workforce between 2.68 and 3.09 to adjust to 
shocks, a rate of adjustment similar to that reported for European family farms (Petrick and 
Zier, 2012; Stefano et al., 1992).  Since casual labor can be easily substituted for permanent 
labor, it is normally expected that overall employment will have a lower coefficient of 
adjustment than any of the individual employment categories. The finding here that the size 
of the overall labor force adjusts more quickly than permanent employment must mean that 
casual employment adjusts quickly, which is evidence of the special relationship between 
these workers and their employers described by Du Toit (1993) and of the deepening of the 
divide between insiders and outsiders in the wine industry caused by post-apartheid labor 
market regulation (Ewert and Du Toit, 2005).  
As expected the quantity of casual labor demanded on wine farms is shown to adjust more 
rapidly than the employment of permanent labor. In specification 12 the coefficient of 
adjustment (1 – αt-1 = 1 – 0.662 = 0.338) is 50-70% higher that estimated for permanent labor 
and within the range of 0.150-0.577 determined by OLS and the fixed effects model. 
Specification 12 easily passed the other diagnostic tests too with values of p<0.421 and 
p<0.599 on Hansen’s J and the AR(2) tests. The short run wage elasticity of -5.615 is 
dramatically larger than the corresponding elasticities reported for permanent or overall labor 
demand. Despite the lack of spatial variation in the statutory minimum wage this coefficient 
is significant at p<0.05. The long run component of the employment response to a wage 
change is also positive, but smaller than the short run effect so that the net effect (γt + γt-1 = -
5.615+ 4.017 = -1.598) is negative as expected. It too is significant at p<0.05. The second 
component of the output elasticity is less precisely fitted in model 12 than in specifications 7 
and 8 but is nonetheless retained in the elasticity calculation to enable a direct comparison to 
the other estimates. Unlike in the other models there is evidence of capital-labor substitution 
shown by the positive and significant coefficient on machinery cost. This means that should 
wine or energy prices rise, there will not be an effect on employment.  
The elasticity results reported in Table 4 are explained above and the short run numbers are 
just the coefficients on the wage, see Table 3.  The long run results are the figures reported in 
the previous paragraph for γt + γt-1, divided by the adjustment elasticities.  The overall wage 
elasticity of -0.34 in the short run confirms earlier results for the wine industry (Conradie, 
2005a). The slightly larger figure of -0.38 for the long run suggests that most of the 
employment changes are apparent immediately after a wage increase. While some people 
may get exercised by the potential to increase the total wage bill by further wage increases, 
policy makers must recognise that people who lose jobs as a result of rising wages will find it 
difficult to find other work in the current employment climate.  
Table 4 
In KwaZulu-Natal the massive casualization of agricultural jobs following labor market 
reform pushed up the long run wage elasticity for permanent labor from -0.23 in the period 
1960 to 1990 to -1.34 in the period 1991 to 2005 (Sparrow et al., 2008). In the wine industry 
there was not the same urgency to reduce permanent workers, as the less than unitary long 
run wage elasticities for this category of worker illustrate. But the less than unitary long run 
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area elasticities of 0.56 and 0.80 show that these secure and well paid positions will be 
created at a slower pace than before as the wine industry continues to expand. The emphasis 
is now predominantly on casual employment where wage elasticities are -5.62 in the short 
run and -4.73 in the long run, pointing to much greater vulnerability for these workers if 
wages rise. A sensible future wage policy can still salvage the employment situation as the 
overall output elasticity of 0.98 in the long run indicates that so far the farms in this sample 
have opted for casualization over mechanization. However, policy makers must appreciate 
that every time the statutory minimum wage is increased the government is gambling with 
jobs and the livelihoods of poor people. Therefore, the proposed further 44.6% increase 
implied by a universal statutory minimum wage of ZAR 3,500 (US $250) is not a good idea 
that has very serious negative implication and should be resisted. 
 
Conclusions   
This paper applied a dynamic panel estimation model to farm-level wage and employment 
data for 77 farms in the Western Cape Province of South Africa from 2005 to 2015 to 
estimate wage and output elasticities for the wine industry. The results show that even the 
51% wage increase in 2013 may have had only a limited impact on full time employment, as 
the long run elasticity of labor with respect to wages is only -0.58 to -0.70. An elasticity of 
way below unity means that the fall in employment is heavily outweighed by the rise in 
wages of those still employed and the total remuneration of permanent staff will rise. But, 
while the remaining workers gain, this is no consolation to those who do lose their jobs and 
they will suffer severe difficulty in finding work due to high levels of rural unemployment. 
However, the main finding emphases that this comes at a heavy cost to casual workers and 
this is the group that bear almost all the losses. For casual workers the long run wage 
elasticity of -4.73 means that the 51% wage increase must be expected to result in a 240% 
decrease in jobs. Thus, it is the poorest and most vulnerable who suffer as a result of a policy 
intended to help them. 
The underlying problem that cannot be directly addressed by this paper is the move to 
increased mechanisation.  Further increases in the statutory minimum wage for agriculture 
could result in capital-biased technical change that will reduce employment and job security 
in the long run. Further wage increases can also have a negative impact on wine value since 
viticulture practices such as canopy manipulation and crop control are labor intensive and 
hard to mechanise. Neglecting these tasks further as a means of reducing labor costs will be 
detrimental to wine quality. Therefore the industry is at risk of returning to bulk wine 
production rather than export quality output. Thus, the 2013 increase in the statutory 
minimum wage has resulted in farmers choosing to produce poorer quality wines, which 
undermines the viability of the industry in the long run. Policy makers should recognise that 
the future of the industry and its workforce are bound up with decisions made now about 
wine quality. Loss of market share to competitors like Australia, New Zealand and South 
America would mean a difficult future.  Greater research and development and a more 
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generous extension budget combined with less political uncertainty would help to secure the 
future of this industry, which is a major contributer to GDP in the Western Cape Province.    
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics, 77 farms for the period 2005 – 2015 (Means with standard deviations below) 
             Growth % per year  
 Units 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 All yrs 2005-12 Δ 2013/4 
                
Vineyard size ha 101 101 103 104 104 105 107 108 109 111 111 0.74 0.74 2.21 
  82 84 86 87 86 85 88 92 96 100 101    
                
Wine price R/ton* 3543 3090 2986 2616 2702 2775 2693 2621 2570 2423 2489 -2.30 -3.01 -5.70 
  1843 1498 1434 1269 1329 1310 1170 1143 1128 872 1006    
                
Yield ton/ha 13.1 14.7 14.6 15.5 15.6 14.9 14.6 16.3 17.2 17.8 16.9 2.53 1.73 3.54 
  7.2 8.6 7.5 7.9 7.1 9.2 7.4 8.5 9.3 8.2 8.5    
                
Machine ready % 84 84 85 85 85 85 86 86 87 87 87 0.30 0.33 - 
  29 29 28 28 29 28 28 28 28 28 28    
                
Machine picked %     37 40 41 42 45 47 51 2.15 1.67 3.50 
      39 40 40 41 40 40 40    
                
Minimum wage R/year 13144 13734 14181 12990 13115 14198 14443 14283 14789 21072 21360 4.14 1.00 42.49 
  1236 1225 786 324           
                
Permanent wage R/year 16936 17193 18562 17004 17213 18138 18672 18312 19288 21038 21845 2.20 1.00 9.07 
  8846 9107 9356 8614 10375 11812 12562 13036 13508 14531 11392    
                
Permanent workers Employees 26.4 26.9 26.1 25.5 25.3 26.0 26.6 26.7 27.2 27.3 26.9 -0.72 0.52 0.43 
  17.7 17.8 16.6 16.8 16.9 18.8 20.8 20.2 22.2 22.2 21.9    
                
Casual fulltime equiv. Employees 15.3 14.2 14.7 16.0 17.2 16.7 16.9 17.0 17.5 13.1 13.5 -0.19 -0.65 -25.25 
  24.8 22.3 24.7 25.3 27.2 26.9 28.1 28.7 27.8 20.9 19.1    
                
Total employment Employees 41.7 41.0 40.8 41.6 42.5 42.7 43.5 43.6 44.6 40.3 40.4 -0.09 0.43 -9.62 
  34.3 32.2 33.9 34.2 35.8 35.7 39.0 39.4 40.3 34.8 33.4    
                
Labor intensity Ha/worker 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.7 2.7 2.7 3.0 2.9 0.83 0.31 10.64 
  1.0 1.2 1.1 1.0 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.3    
                
*The wages and financial figures are all in constant 2010 Rand 
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Table 2: Results of diagnostic tests to select preferred specifications (in bold). All models fitted with systems GMM.  
 
Model 
 
Variables listed as GMM instruments 
 
Cross sections 
 
Instruments 
 
Hansen’s J test 
 
AR(2) process 
 
Wage coefficients 
Output 
coefficients 
  Number p-values 
        
Overall labor demand 
1 Lagged employment, wage 77 37 0.104 0.559 0.000 
0.015 
0.061 
0.403 
2 Lagged employment, wage, area 77 47 0.256 0.452 0.000 
0.011 
0.005 
0.364 
3 Lagged employment, wage, area, capital cost 77 57 0.108 0.923 0.000 
0.013 
0.002 
0.100 
4 Lagged employment, wage, area, capital cost, wine price 77 67 0.071 0.876 0.000 
0.008 
0.003 
0.111 
        
Demand for permanent workers 
5 Lagged employment, wage 77 38 0.010 0.234 0.000 
0.178 
0.853 
0.754 
6 Lagged employment, wage, area 77 48 0.054 0.322 0.000 
0.026 
0.016 
0.24 
7 Lagged employment, wage, area, capital cost 77 58 0.180 0.328 0.000 
0.014 
0.001 
0.038 
8 Lagged employment, wage, area, capital cost, wine price 77 68 0.202 0.391 0.000 
0.038 
0.001 
0.011 
        
Demand for casual labor 
9 Lagged employment 74 28 0.152 0.755 0.316 
0.336 
0.484 
0.619 
10 Lagged employment, area 74 38 0.472 0.556 0.374 
0.372 
0.940 
0.724 
11 Lagged employment, wage, area, capital cost 74 48 0.483 0.694 0.084 
0.104 
0.394 
0.933 
12 Lagged employment, wage, area, capital cost, wine price 74 58 0.421 0.599 0.018 
0.021 
0.211 
0.816 
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Table 3: Determinants of labor demand for a sample Western Cape wine farms, 2005-2015 
 Specification 2: Overall demand Specification 7: Permanent labor Specification 8: Permanent labor Specification 12: Casual labor 
 Coefficient Robust SE Coefficient Robust SE Coefficient Robust SE Coefficient Robust SE 
Ln(employment)it-1 0.6503*** 0.0742 0.7991*** 0.0597 0.7722*** 0.0493 0.6622*** 0.1437 
ln(wage)it -0.3408*** 0.0639 -0.2792*** 0.0462 -0.3000*** 0.0501 -5.6150** 2.3138 
ln(wage)it-1 0.2079** 0.0796 0.1628** 0.0647 0.1397** 0.0661 4.0173** 1.7011 
ln(vineyard area)it 0.4263** 0.1472 0.3107*** 0.0921 0.3116*** 0.0887 0.5862 0.4649 
ln(vineyard area)it-1 -0.0834 0.0914 -0.1497** 0.0710 -0.1849** 0.0708 -0.0713 0.3050 
ln(machine cost)it 0.1877 0.1174 0.0893 0.0606 0.0529 0.0559 0.7100** 0.3419 
ln(machine cost)it-1 -0.1954 0.1394 -0.0009 0.0448 -0.0307 0.0448 0.0886 0.2336 
ln(wine price)it 0.0901 0.0566 -0.0492 0.1106 -0.1090 0.0728 0.0703 0.2980 
ln(casual wage)it   -0.0147 0.1803 0.2730 0.2303   
ln(regular workers)it       -0.6031* 0.3499 
Breede Dummy -0.0031 0.0747 0.4763 1.8315 -0.4154 1.8856 -1.8783** 0.8310 
Orange Dummy 0.2995** 0.1460 0.6177 1.8317 -0.5494 1.9247 0.0000 (omitted) 
Stellenbosch Dummy 0.0000 (omitted) 0.4989 1.9110 -0.4648 1.9670 -0.8381 0.9015 
West Coast Dummy -0.0534 0.0584 0.3980 1.8192 -0.4853 1.8745 -1.7778* 0.9913 
Yr2005 Dummy 0.0000 (omitted) 0.0000 (omitted) 0.0000 (omitted) 0.0000 (omitted) 
Yr2006 Dummy -0.0147 0.0622 0.0505 0.0944 0.1423 0.1132 6.8318 10.0281 
Yr2007 Dummy -0.0133 0.0495 0.0257 0.0850 0.1168 0.1067 6.8881 10.0404 
Yr2008 Dummy -0.0075 0.0499 -0.0463 0.0994 0.0675 0.1238 6.3109 9.8891 
Yr2009 Dummy 0.0144 0.0463 -0.0100 0.0888 0.0932 0.1135 6.9368 9.9793 
Yr2010 Dummy 0.0199 0.0403 0.0018 0.0798 0.0861 0.1002 7.0672 10.0636 
Yr2011 Dummy -0.0101 0.0447 0.0009 0.0681 0.0857 0.0895 6.7384 10.0530 
Yr2012 Dummy -0.0137 0.0320 -0.0124 0.0705 0.0844 0.0943 6.4687 10.0161 
Yr2013 Dummy 0.0382* 0.0220 -0.0080 0.0617 0.0838 0.0840 6.7929 10.0723 
Yr2014 Dummy 0.0000 (omitted) 0.0069 0.0193 0.0000 (omitted) 8.3097 10.5257 
Yr2015 Dummy  0.0538** 0.0260 0.0000 (omitted) -0.0044 0.0185 7.2596 10.4730 
Constant 0.3851 1.1489 0.0000 (omitted) 0.0000 (omitted) 0.0000 (omitted) 
Observations 770  770  770  664  
Groups 77  77  77  74  
Instruments 47  58  68  58  
F-stat 144.28  6479.40  4276.32  84.16  
AR(2) p-value 0.452  0.328  0.391  0.599  
Hansen’s p-value 0.256  0.180  0.202  0.421  
Adjustment range 0.096-0.481  0.008-0.376  0.008-0.376  0.150-0.577  
Note that the lagged dependent and wage variables varies across specifications depending on the class of labour examined. Models in first differences  *** p ≤ 0.001, ** p ≤ 0.05, * p ≤ 0.10 
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Table 4: Wage and output elasticities of overall, permanent and casual labor, 2005-2015 
 Wage elasticity Output elasticity 
 Short run Long run Short run Long run 
 𝛾1 (𝛾1 + 𝛾2) (1 − 𝛼1)⁄  
 
 
  
   All labor -0.34 -0.38 0.43 0.98 † 
   Permanent jobs specification 7  -0.28 -0.58 0.31 0.80 
                            specification 8 -0.30 -0.70 0.31 0.56 
   Casual jobs -5.62 -4.73 0.59 1.52 † 
     
† Only significant at lower levels of confidence  
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Figure 1: Size and composition of the South African national vineyard with relative prices of 
Cabernet sauvignon to dry white wine 
 
 
Source (www.sawis.co.za)  
 
